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Abstract
This article attempts to understand the economic and informatic ramifications of the convergence
between increasingly connective games and massive online platforms by considering recent trends in
both that center around designing for emergence. Scholarship on emergence as a property of games
overwhelmingly treats emergent design as a liberating force that privileges player agency in a virtual
space. Yet, as games fuse with surrounding platform ecosystems like Steam, Facebook, and Google, those
emergent behaviors are subject to vast systems of inscription that analyze user behavior in order to
reshape the free space of emergence and extract greater social and financial capital. At the same time,
platforms grow more and more gamified in order to impel users toward interactions that will yield the
most valorizable forms of engagement while maintaining the illusion of user agency. Examining the
popular design trend of games-as-a-service alongside the public scandal surrounding Facebook's
extractive practices shows that the trajectory of these overlapping systems actually colonize the free space
of emergence, making it the territory from which technologies of control are derived.
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The Unfree Space of Play: Emergence and 
Control in the Video Game and the Platform 
Digital technologies have radically altered modes of cultural, economic, 
and social production while also blurring the lines between them. A deluge 
of terms has crashed over different discursive spheres in an attempt to pin 
down this historical moment: late capitalism, postmodernism, network 
society, the society of control, platform capitalism, ludocapitalism or, more 
succinctly, Empire as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) use the 
term, a totalizing global order. The different valences and specificities 
undergirding these terms keep them somewhat separate - they are not 
perfect synonyms for one another—but they all share certain similarities. 
They all acknowledge the rise of a new form of capitalist production or 
reproduction—a sea-change in the technologies that allow people and 
groups to communicate, a tendency toward more decentralized, 
rhizomatic forms of control, a move away from monolithic hierarchical 
arrangements, so on and so on.  
We have moved past the industrial era dominated by the 
Foucauldian mechanisms of discipline, of which the enclosed and 
separate spaces of the factory and the school are paradigmatic, into a 
strange new world characterized by “ultrarapid forms of free-floating 
control” (Deleuze 2009, p. 90). The enclosure has become a mold, a 
modulation. The rigid definition in time and space has been exploded 
leaving the inside/outside dichotomy, alongside the mass/individual and 
now/later pairs, deeply troubled. Now one never leaves the site of 
production as long as one has access to e-mail and teleconferencing, one 
never “finishes” school, one never exists in the here and now but rather “a 
sort of endless digital Now” (Gibson 2012, p. 44) always with one foot in 
the near future. The factory itself gives way to the corporate platform, 
“generative mechanisms, engines that set the terms of participation 
according to fixed protocols” (Bratton 2015, p. 374), platforms like Google, 
Facebook, Uber, YouTube, etc which connect us and define our actions. 
The breakdown of those dichotomies which felt so naturally suited to 
cause-and-effect, binary thought has led to an age governed by paradox, 
with perhaps one central one: in the society of control, in which those 
fortunate enough to have ready access to the internet can choose from all 
its treasures, an endless cornucopia of choice, how are we subject to 
more control than ever? We should look to videogames – the medium of 
this century—and the platform, this century's factory—and to the ways that 
they facilitate and restrict; in short how they modulate. It is one thing to 
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recognize that “in societies of control there is both an increase in 
openness and an increase in control” (Galloway and Thacker 2007, p. 73). 
It is another to recognize that this paradox extends and broadens into a 
designing for, and embracing of, the unexpected, the contingent.   
This essay aims to shed some light on the way that platforms and 
games have begun merging and how their dependence upon emergent 
behaviors situates them within the society of control. The videogame and 
the platform offer us the two halves of the logic of control. The videogame 
shows us how algorithmic affordances, which “fetishize control” (Galloway 
2006, p. 93) generate an illusion of choice useful for governing biopower. 
The platform, the videogame's twin, reterritorializes rhizomatic space 
allowing for a new centralization in a rhizomatic world—terms and 
concepts which will be elucidated below.  Their growing together is as 
inevitable as it is ominous. 
Let us begin by looking at the current state of videogames, the 
valorization of emergence currently prevalent in the industry, and the ways 
in which the aesthetics of emergence overlap with the functioning of 
platforms. 
Games 
The great paradox of the game is that it is fundamentally defined by rules 
and limitations, yet is experienced as a release from the constraints of life 
and the world. Eric Zimmerman (2004): “play exists both because of and 
despite the more rigid structures of a system” (p. 159). The complex 
behaviors and peculiar individuality of each play session arise from this 
simple contradiction. A player's distinctive play style in a game like chess 
cannot transcend the rules of chess, but is an expression of his or her 
individual talents and understanding of the game within the game. 
Likewise, no two games of a sport like basketball are ever truly identical. 
The players cannot 'break' the rules, but within the heavily constrained 
time and space of a game of basketball there is a nearly infinite (sub)set of 
possible actions which ensures the uniqueness of character of a player 
and of any single game, all of which is only meaningful as a result of the 
game's rules. All of those unique characteristics that arise during play and 
which are the evidence of a well-crafted system–yet which are impossible 
for the game's designer to anticipate—are called emergent. Designers 
refer to unexpected actions that are technically allowable by the game's 
strictures emergent behaviors. The unscripted stories that people form in 
the field of play, the close scrapes, near misses, and last-minute underdog 
victories, are called emergent narratives. Games – most analogue games 
and more and more videogames – which privilege a degree of behavioral 
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openness over tightly delimited, largely linear progress (Juul 2005, p. 76) 
are, then, called emergent games.  
Preoccupation with emergence in games represents a particular 
design philosophy which privileges mechanical complexity over some of 
the more conventional selling points of games – graphical fidelity, narrative 
immersion, character design – in order to maximize the quality which is 
exclusive to the medium. It is a thoroughly algorithmic approach to design 
deeply rooted in the medium essentialism of the early ludologists, scholars 
of the early-to-mid 2000's like Jesper Juul and Espen Aarseth who 
understood games as sets of rules and algorithms first and foremost. The 
purpose of the game viewed from the perspective of rules and algorithms 
rather than narrative necessitates a change in thought. Viewed from a 
cinematic perspective—one of the ludologists' most hated sins—games 
which are narratively and visually rich supported by limited interactivity in 
the vein of Don Bluth's Dragon's Lair, are successful. But from the 
algorithmic, ludological perspective these games represent spectacular 
failures. Rather, the narrative complexity should emerge from the rules 
themselves. Zimmerman's perfect example is Ms. Pac-Man, “a narrative in 
which procedures, relationships, and complex systems dynamically signify. 
It is the kind of narrative that only a game could tell” (p. 162). The story is 
a story of the player and the player's experience, which must differ from 
the experiences of others in a meaningful way.  
While a full history of emergence in games is well outside the 
bounds of this essay, suffice it to say that the design strategies aimed at 
maximizing emergent experiences and their associated genres change 
with consumer taste, fads, and simple, raw processing power. In the 
1990's the ascendant mechanics-heavy genres were fighting games and 
complex immersive sims—i.e. systems-heavy simulations of fantastic 
environments). In the 2000s, the popularity of games like Everquest and 
Runescape paved the way for the explosive popularity of Blizzard's World 
of Warcraft as the endless novelty of the MMORPG captured people's 
social imagination. But the highest profile and most enduring games in the 
last several years have been highly competitive, frequently updated 
multiplayer games like League of Legends, Dota 2, and Overwatch. The 
finer points of their play vary wildly: League and Dota 2 throw players into 
a top-down, real-time-strategy style map while Overwatch is what is 
typically called a “hero shooter,” a game in which players run and gun 
through the enemy team in first-person to try and fulfill different game 
modes’ objectives. Despite their ludological differences, all three fit nicely 
into the gaming industry's current craze: games as a service (Schreier 
2017), an economic model that aims to prolong the life—and profitability—
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of a game indefinitely. Games as a service is the attempt by developers 
and producers to recast individual games as platforms of networked 
activities and communications that do not end. These games thrive on 
emergence. Their designers work to maintain a constant flux in character 
strength and the viability of particular play styles in order to keep players 
away from dominant strategies. To excel, players must not only play 
constantly to remain familiar with the nuance of the game throughout 
these changes but must also work on the game outside of its bounds, 
through sites like mobafire.com and leaguecraft.com, to study up on 
character strengths, item optimization, team synergies, tactics, and so 
forth.  
Minecraft is the second-best selling game of all time—after the 
venerable Tetris—and it could not be more different from e-sports darlings 
like Overwatch and League of Legends. The premise is simple: the game 
offers a nigh-endless expanse of terrain of various types that the player 
can mine for materials in order to then build whatever his or her heart 
desires out of blocks. Players build massive structures in this game with 
no extrinsic motivation; they build full scale replicas of Game of Thrones' 
Westeros simply to have done so (Domanico 2015). There is very little 
hard-coded competition in Minecraft. The game sports survival and story 
modes, but the game's true selling-point is its free-play mode, in which 
players roam a voxelated, nigh-infinite realm with the aim to build things. 
Minecraft is the emergent game par excellence; developer Mojang has 
created a game world that allows players free reign to express 
themselves, while the networked connectivity of the game – the key to its 
success (Isbister 2016, p. 43) – ensures that the prospect of displaying 
one’s creation to other players offers a soft, social goal that structures 
player behavior. Minecraft is only emergence. The endlessly 
reconfigurable sandbox it provides to players only has as much meaning 
as players express through it. It cannot be beaten or finished—one player 
spent years documenting his attempt to simply reach the edge of the 
game's map in a series of over 600 videos; as of 2018 he has not even 
come close (Kurtjmac 2018).  
Jean Baudrillard (2003) has written that “the end is also the finality 
or purpose of something, that which gives it meaning. And when you are in 
processes developing in a chain reaction, which, beyond a certain critical 
mass, become exponential, they no longer have any finality or meaning … 
we are already in an exponential, unlimited form in which everything 
develops in the void, to infinity, without any possibility of reapprehending it” 
(pp. 59-61). The endlessness of emergent games satisfies the platform's 
need for insatiable growth as well as becoming an expression of it, always 
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reconfiguring and re-actualizing without collapsing into finality. There is no 
end, no inside and outside to the modern videogame. They are not the 
virtual worlds that critics, scholars, and futurists envisioned in the aughts—
though they took notes from earlier MMO’s—but rather full-blown API-
enabled platforms through which people can play the games, purchase 
virtual commodities, chat, and strategize unconstrained by the bounds of 
the magic circle. Games join all the other aspects of postmodern society 
that proliferate endlessly into the void. Like the modern state of crisis 
(Hardt and Negri 2000) in which states rule through perpetual exception to 
the norm via ostensibly temporary measures epitomized by the PATRIOT 
Act; like warfare, which becomes “banal” (Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter 
2009) and devolves into continuous police action without specific goals; 
like narratives and franchises (Ndalianis 2004) which endure in theaters 
and on screens indefinitely, videogames have no ending, placing them 
formally and firmly in line with these other phenomena. 
Yet games have always been without end. One cannot complete 
football nor finish cricket.  Even Ms. Pac-Man, Zimmerman's already-
ancient example, was conceived of by a small company called General 
Computer as an update board referred to as an “enhancement kit” to 
make Pac-Man less soluble after fans found dominant strategies—i.e. 
universally ideal strategies—to maximize scores in the original game (Kent 
2001, pp. 167-173). Games and their dynamic narratives have always 
derived their lasting strength from their emergent properties. Whence the 
difference, whence the platforming of games? The difference now is that 
games are interconnected with vast extractive apparatuses which analyze 
the emergent gap between rules and freedom, record the myriad 
executions of player actions, and then double as pipelines for modification 
by pushing through updates in real-time. Games' emergent properties 
reflect back on the rules and algorithms themselves. The ontology of the 
game is in perpetual flux, shaped by the fluid and myriad actualizations of 
their complex rules, wearing away any imperfect edges in the system. 
The videogame should be understood as very much like and yet 
very much unlike other franchise entertainment, which depends upon 
rampant serialization—think Marvel or Star Wars – really any Disney 
property—to ensure a steady stream of profits to the studio. On the one 
hand, videogames also exist primarily as commodities, objects to be 
bought and sold in order to generate revenue, no different from any other 
commodity to be melted down into the universal medium of capital. All the 
tactics implemented by manipulative triple-A studios ultimately feed back 
into the one central pursuit of profit. But on the other, videogames also 
break past even the reproductive logic of film and television. New 
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installments of a successful Marvel franchise may come out regularly as 
creatives generate ever-more-sprawling hyperdiegetic worlds that can 
conceivably house an infinite number of distinct stories, but only 
videogames can truly be said to impel user-players to occupy the space—
except perhaps platforms, which I will address shortly—and pursue goals 
dictated therein. The control of the videogame should also be understood 
as radically different from the analog game. What separates the 
videogame from the game, and the society of control from the disciplinary 
society, is the radical difference between algorithmic affordance and rule. 
The affordance offers a brand new way to interact with a virtual world, a 
game, other people, etc. The rule, meanwhile, is a sociolinguistically-fixed 
limitation that is only ever a pact between players. There is nothing 
physically stopping a bored child playing Monopoly from moving his or her 
piece wherever they want; only other players can do that, typically to the 
displeasure of the offending child. In the digital game, affordances are 
usually hard-coded into the system itself. They are perceived as liberating 
rather than restricting, even if they amount to the same restraint as 
traditional rulesets.  
Platforms, as we shall see below, are fundamentally devices which 
feed off of the behaviors which emerge from their affordances by 
quantifying and storing vast amounts of behavioral data. They facilitate 
behaviors to their own gain. The game as a medium has typically only 
been interested in how it is played in order to further improve the 
gameplay experience. It directs much more explicitly by allocating 
intention through the “valorization of outcome” (Juul 2005, p. 36), but 
nobody much minded as long as games remained in their own magic 
circle of triviality. A major component of the platforming of the videogame 
comes with the adoption of data-focused techniques most often 
associated with platforms. Game designers have always looked to 
professional testers and focus groups to analyze the efficacy of play in a 
game, but the analytical capabilities of modern game platforms allow for a 
qualitatively new level of control.  
Not only do individual games increasingly resemble platforms in 
their breadth and indeterminability, but gaming itself is increasingly 
invested in individual platforms which read and type player 'dividuals.' 
Stuart Brown (2010), for instance, has offered up eight player types: 
artist/creator, collector, competitor, director, explorer, kinesthete, 
storyteller, and joker (p. 65). Steam, a game distribution and play platform 
which commands somewhere between 50% to 70% of all PC game 
downloads (Grubb 2017), is the prime example. Steam's analytics can 
measure a player's libraries, play history, interpersonal chat interaction, 
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etc while the client also links to Google Analytics to track pages visited in-
client. Game consoles, long considered platforms, have also been 
mutating into connected platforms. The Playstation 4 has a 'share button' 
which allows players to blend their gameplay with Facebook, Twitch, and 
others with a single press. And of course players are most likely to share 
unexpected moments that others will not necessarily see in their own 
games. Emergence strikes again. 
These games and their systems are always, finally, a means to 
profit. They encourage emergent behavior in order to remain relevant. This 
works both ways. Through distribution platforms like Steam or proprietary 
systems companies make for their own games–the League of Legends 
client, Ubisoft's Uplay—they become platforms that can and do measure 
and store all manner of player behaviors. This helps the endless cycle of 
patching keep games from being solvable—which is both an aesthetic 
virtue for the game and an economic virtue for the owner-rentier—while 
analytics provide not only behavioral but economic control by “[opening] 
the gates to new monetization opportunities, either through targeted 
advertising or, more frequently in the past few years, by allowing game 
developers to deduce when the most appropriate moment to suggest a 
micro-transaction within the game” (Freire et. al. 2016, p. 11). More 
aleatory practices on the part of developers through “random drops” and 
“loot boxes”—reward systems which grant players random in-game items 
based on the quantity and quality of their play—can be so effectively 
crafted to manipulate players that some regions are working to ban the 
practice (Shah 2017). The platforming of games is the converting of play 
into Hardt and Negri’s biopower (2000), “in which the economic, the 
political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another” (p. 
xiii) and establish a much tighter regime of social control, or what Dyer-
Witheford and De Peuter (2009) have termed biopower play which, like 
actual biopower, is still governed to the same end: perpetual accumulation 
of capital, of data, and of attention which are themselves increasingly 
indistinguishable from one another.  
Platforms 
Not too long ago critics and designers used the term platform in order to 
describe largely physical devices: “specific hardware and software 
combinations, like a particular game console or mobile device with its own 
operating system, hardwired (inscribed and coded) chips, and input 
technologies (keypad, game controller, accelerometer) system, a number 
of formats, each with their own affordances and constraints” (Murray 2012, 
p. 34). The old notion of a platform has not left us yet – MIT Press's 
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Platform Studies series still addresses the intersection of hardware with 
software design, and it serves us well to remember that no digital object 
exists outside a material base. But the conventional definition has been 
slowly supplanted in the past decade or so with the intensification of 
networking. The platform we know now is an altogether more abstract 
structure. Platforms today ultimately mediate everything – the social 
(Twitter, Facebook), the commercial (Amazon), the logistical (Google), the 
cultural (all of the above) – without the tangible constraints of apparent 
hardware specificity, with one of their few shared qualities being 
abstraction itself. The old hardware/software paradigm of platform 
definition conceived of the platform as an engine for virtualization, a 
machine which sustains, presents, and represents the virtual. The modern 
platform is, instead, itself virtual and only dubiously locatable. Benjamin 
Bratton's (2015) slightly more contemporary definition is appropriately 
involved: “a standards-based technical-economic system that 
simultaneously distributes interfaces through their remote coordination 
and centralizes their integrated control through that same coordination” (p. 
42). Nick Srnicek's (2017) definition, though simpler, is no less abstract: 
“At the most general level platforms are digital infrastructures that enable 
two or more groups to interact” (p. 43). He acknowledges non-digital 
platforms while arguing that their inefficiency renders them less than ideal 
in the current economic landscape (p. 134).  
This definitional change speaks to a rampant virtualization, a de-
actualizing of economic and social centers into Deleuze's “ultra-rapid 
forms of free-floating control” (p. 90). The rigid material structures and 
institutions of the disciplinary society which govern by impressing 
ideological discipline onto political subjects through the strength of the 
system's walls and its subsequent contextualization evaporate into the 
networks. The physical bounds of the school, the barracks, the prison, the 
company disappear into algorithmic codes, and each become a “free-
floating” context capable of being realized anywhere. The school extends 
indefinitely throughout one's life, beginning with the social obligation 
toward higher education and continuing with endless seminars, retreats, 
and re-training events even as e-mail and online classes transport the 
walls of the school to one's living room or a nearby coffee shop. The 
corporation exists not as a single building, but as a constantly renewed 
coalition of semi-autonomous agents, some housed inside company 
buildings tethered to one another only by fiber-optic cable while others 
exist in a limbo of precarity as contractors telecommuting from home and 
accessing the data necessary to perform their functions remotely. This 
hypothetical company is in perpetual need of actualization and re-
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actualization. Pierre Levy (1998) provides a lucid explanation: “the 
virtualization of the corporation consists primarily of transforming the 
spatiotemporal coordinates of work into a continuously renewed problem 
rather than a stable solution. The organizations center of gravity is no 
longer a group of buildings, workstations, and schedules, but a process of 
coordination” (p. 26-27). Look to the great titans of postmodern American 
industry: Google, Apple, Microsoft, YouTube, all companies whose 
products are platforms and which are themselves dependent upon 
platformed communication to sustain their trans-national bulk. In other 
words, all perfectly indicative of the global capitalist enterprise. Even the 
conventional industrial powers depend heavily on either subscriptions to 
industrial platforms or on proprietary platforms of their own in order to best 
coordinate and streamline the production process to shave the least 
fraction of a cent off each unit's cost (Srnicek 2017) via a kind of virtual 
Toyotism. The platform has supplanted the factory, if obliquely, as the 
essential form and symbol of economic power. It is the engine which 
virtualizes the walls of the factory so that they might be re-laid elsewhere 
at any time. 
This is where the concept of the rhizome and the process of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization become key to explaining and 
understanding this centralization. The rhizome is a radically flattened, non-
hierarchical structure wherein each point is capable of connecting to any 
other without resorting to mediation or a central power. As such, it 
represents what the early techno-utopian internet would and could be, a 
topic discussed ad nauseam elsewhere. Yet the rhizome, in Deleuze and 
Guattari's (1987) usage, also forms the map of the interrelationships that 
occur within the individual, between individuals, between groups, between 
concepts, individuals, assemblages, and so on. “The rhizome pertains to a 
map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, 
connectable, reversible, modifiable” (p. 21), neither one nor many yet 
both. And that map is “produced,” modified by the process of 
deterritorialization, the escape of an individual, group, object, quality, 
concept, etc. from its milieu into a new one—reterritorialization—or off into 
its own plane—absolute deterritorialization.  
Individual people, objects, even ideas and qualities deterritorialize 
along what Deleuze and Guattari call “lines of flight,” the vectors along 
which they leave their old contexts and functions to enter new ones. They 
write that “a group or individual creates the line rather than following it” (p. 
204), and in so doing form a new path in the rhizome rather than 
necessarily retracing lines already pathed. In this context, we might 
consider these paths to be reposting, hyperlinking, moving from one digital 
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community to the next, spreading viral content, mutating memes, etc, all 
the behaviors which define networked communication and activity. The 
platform, then, serves as a central node in the rhizome according to its 
connective capacities, encouraging deterritorialization along lines of flight 
so that the platform can then absorb those lines into its own map, its own 
diagram. This is what emergence means to the platform: allowing and 
even designing for lines of flight that the extractive algorithms of the 
platform can then reify as its own territory. The greater the platform's 
capacity for reification, the greater its ability to provide individuals with a 
pool of raw, virtual abstraction they might actualize. The more those 
individuals actualize, the deeper the platform's pool, effecting a growing 
centralization by what McKenzie Wark (2004) calls the vectoralist class 
which “owns the means of realizing the value of these abstractions” (p. 
21).  
The platform thrives off of – indeed depends upon – the networking 
of people. The vast apparatuses of interconnectivity that were envisioned 
as liberating powers for the masses proved to merely require different 
methods of monetization. The platform is precisely that which re-organizes 
that control: “The undifferentiated mass that by its simple presence was 
able to destroy the modern tradition … appears now as a powerful 
productive force and an uncontrollable source of valorization” (Hardt and 
Negri 2000, p. 376). All that was needed was a way to better insinuate loci 
of power into the overly rhizomatic—from the perspective of capital and 
power—early net. In the most direct sense it is a business/technical model 
that requires that people participate in order to actualize the platform's 
naturally inert potential; there can be no Uber without users participating in 
the virtual system. This is the crude, forward facing half of the economic 
model by which Facebook makes its money and satisfies its raison d'être 
by generating ad revenue, Uber and Lyft provide a framework for ride-
sharing for which they pocket a percentage, while Amazon and Alibaba 
offer networked storefronts for digital retail. None of these can operate 
without the willing participation of an active user base. One could argue 
that since every platform is an abstract formal model designed for 
occupation by any and all that its most basic functions require an 
emergent constituency, that the exact configuration of actualization is 
understood from the start to be unknown. There is some truth to this, but 
one might make the same argument of the factory.  
The real dependence on emergence comes from the back-end 
structure of the platform. Behind the scenes, every platform scrapes user 
interactions for data in order to better suit the desires of users—often 
unknown to the users themselves—to target advertising, to sell as 
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resource to other firms, and to maintain control. Much like the game, the 
platform must make sure to maintain a sense of fairness among users by 
archiving every interaction to scour for abuses—one of the more 
admirable uses of unprecedented surveillance, one suspects—and for 
bugs or glitches to keep users siphoning through their digital choke points. 
An aura of fairness and of the sense of algorithmic affordance mentioned 
above insures that use will continue and that the major platforms become 
thicker and thicker nodes in the rhizome, which leads to better and greater 
quantities of data, thus improving services, and so on ad infinitum. Thus 
the platform depends upon emergence in order to find new types of data 
to extract and new changes to make in its perpetual slouching towards 
monopolization (Srnicek 2017). Basically, platforms thrive off the play that 
emerges from their formal structures, their affordances, and limits in much 
the same way as the videogame. Zimmerman's (2004) definition of play as 
“the free space of movement within a more rigid structure” which “exists 
both because of and also despite the more rigid structures of a system” (p. 
159) holds just as true of the platform as of the game. This can be fruitfully 
conceived of in terms of intellectual profit: the platform must generate 
more knowledge than was coded into it in order to monetize the free labor 
of the general intellect.  
Tizianna Terranova points out that the reality of the extractive 
process of free labor is not so simple—one cannot measure intellectual, 
creative, or affective contribution by the same simple, quantitative metrics 
that managers bring to bear on labor-time—and that there remains a kind 
of cultural accursed share to the gift economy of digital community that 
resists co-option by capital. She points out that “Knowledge workers need 
open organizational structures to produce, because the production of 
knowledge is rooted in collaboration” (Terranova 2003) in a space 
unimpeded by total extraction. Not every idea can or should be 
commodified into a paid blog, or a web-series, etc. The genius of the 
platform, like the game, then, is that it foregoes the traditional valorization 
model in which the stories of the masses are shaped into saleable 
products in the form of reality television and instead exploits the 
centralizing tendencies of network effects to chart off the most valuable 
social real estate and extracts value from simple presence there. In the 
same way that Blizzard did not care if you used the virtual space of World 
of Warcraft as a complicated chatroom rather than a game so long as you 
paid your monthly fee, the platform creates the open spaces necessary for 
communal labor and cleverly arrays it with algorithmic tools that 
simultaneously facilitate those processes and measures their success.  
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The four companies mentioned earlier, Google, Apple, Microsoft, 
and YouTube, were all also participants in the National Security Agency's 
domestic spying program PRISM thanks to the centralization they bring to 
the web (Kaplan 2016). Control may increasingly depend upon economic 
forces to manipulate, but traditional sovereign powers can also leverage 
the re-centralizing effects of platforms toward their own ends. Yet it should 
be alarming to note that governments – the US government in this 
example, though any nation of the 5 Eyes and increasingly any nation at 
all – appeal to the platforms rather than the other way around. The 
platform's ability to encourage behaviors in order to capture them outstrips 
the capabilities of traditional government apparatuses. As Bratton (2015) 
points out, “platforms not only have geopolitical ramifications and 
implications; they are a geopolitical condition and constitution in their own 
right” (p. 122). So let it be known that while platforms can and do act as 
sovereign surveillance prostheses, their role in the society of control runs 
so much deeper than that. We see biopower at play once again: in the 
platform one cannot readily distinguish between the social, the economic, 
and the political.  
But the platform needs to encourage use, to create vagaries in 
order to foster emergent behaviors before it can harvest that data. 
Compelling is generally out of the question. Thus platforms must, like most 
power-centers in the society of control, impel users, and no form is better 
suited to impelling, to channeling the desiring-machine, than the game. 
Gamification, after all, is just valorization rebranded. Many have argued 
that in the first years of the 21st century, this realization has fostered a kind 
of world-wide gamification. Julian Dibbell (2006) called it ludocapitalism. 
McKenzie Wark (2007) calls it gamespace: “Play is no longer counter to 
work. Play becomes work; work becomes play. Play outside of work found 
itself captured by the rise of the digital game … The utopian dream of 
liberating play from the game, of a pure play beyond the game, merely 
opened the way for the extension of gamespace into every aspect of 
everyday life” (p. 16) Under ludocapitalism, everything is recast as a kind 
of agonistic striving for victory, an unending cycle of self-betterment in the 
interest of besting others. Perpetual training, perpetual connection with the 
work environment (Lazzarato 1996), and perpetual quota-meeting have 
become the norm in order to achieve victory in an exaggerated form of 
capitalistic competition. With the ludic platform, we can add perpetual 
social engagement to that list.  
Many platforms leave this vague. Platform gamification must remain 
relatively loose in setting objectives or they risk limiting the data by limiting 
emergence. YouTube encourages and rewards the breaking of viewer and 
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subscriber records, both through higher monetization deals and oddly 
antiquated plaques to channels who manage to surpass certain arbitrary 
viewer thresholds. Snapchat and Timehop maintain a crude kind of 
scoring system that alerts users to their “streaks,” or how many days in a 
row they have engaged with the platform, engaged with specific other 
“friends,” etc. Grubhub, a food ordering platform, has distributed the usual 
“customer reward” discounts in the form of spinners and minigames to add 
a “lootbox” dimension to an otherwise mundane activity. Grubhub's (2015) 
website exhorts others to do the same: “Everyone loves a good game. 
Turn your loyalty program into a game and add an extra level of 
entertainment to the customer experience. Consider using a badging or 
ranking system. As customers rack up visits to your restaurant, they rise in 
rank, and the higher they go, the better the rewards they receive.” 
Gamification extends to less obvious platforms as well. Even the 
more staid, less public facing industrial platform faces gamification in the 
near future, as factory owners look for ways to wring out self-motivation 
from employees. Simple industrial tasks like the repetitive tightening of 
bolts can be gamified via a platform interface to encourage an 
unconscious flow-state in the worker, leading to more orderly and regular 
labor (Roh et. al 2016). This is not a particularly emergent practice, but 
one we can expect to see more of in the near future.  
With the success of Pokemon Go breaking functional AR into the 
mainstream, we can also expect further use of platform enabled—as well 
as bankrolled and designed—AR technology to cast the impelling logic of 
the game-platform into real space. If one of gamification's great uses is 
educational (Bogost 2010, p. 245) then the society of control can easily 
use games to “educate” to its own ends—through a lucrative deal with one 
of the tech giants, no doubt. One of the games first developed by 
Pokemon Go developer Niantic while it was still attached to Google was 
an AR game called Ingress, in which players on two opposing teams 
compete with one another to tag landmarks and form “control fields.”  
Bratton has pointed out that the “ludic demands of Ingress are to send 
people out into their cities training them to see, attack, and defend against 
the territorial incursions of enemies perceivable only through special 
software-enabled perspectives” (p. 242). This is effectively a recasting of 
earlier discourses surrounding joystick warfare (Penny 2004) and the 
military-entertainment complex, but one whose persistence helps to 
illuminate the lines running from platform-corporation to game to sovereign 
body.  
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Lessons 
So then the governing logic of our time is the property of emergence. If 
this is broadly true of network actions and especially true of platforms, 
what can the study of games tell us about the functioning of platforms? 
Firstly that we can reverse-engineer the design precepts governing 
platforms through the lens of game design. The purpose of the platform 
can be meaningfully concentrated to “continued use,” and the engaging 
game is the one that players will play “again and again if something about 
the experience continues to engage them with 'variety, novelty, and 
surprise'” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, p. 165). Veteran games journalist 
Leigh Alexander (2013), discussing the legendary Warren Spector's ideas 
on emergence, offered that designers aim to “create global rules versus 
specific, instanced behavior of objects and characters; build interlocking 
systems that are predictable and consistent but not pre-determined.” 
Game-platform convergence can expose the still-prevalent myth 
that expression through platforms is largely free. Games' status as fictions 
invites a cultural critique, and nobody would assert that what one does in 
the broadest sandbox game like Skyrim is constrained only by the limits of 
one's own imagination. Emergence is still a product of restraints, and 
breaking Skyrim or Deus Ex is still an expression not of the player, really, 
but of the system and its algorithms. What one does on Facebook, what 
one says on Twitter, or what one uploads to YouTube my seem free—“I 
can say whatever I want on here!”—but is still shaped by the affordances 
coded into each platform, though recent debates over the limits of freedom 
of speech have thrown this discrepancy into sharper relief. Game designer 
Harvey Smith has argued for “systemic level design” which privileges 
emergence because “it allows for more self-expression on the players' 
part; the players can solve problems the way they want to solve them 
rather than the way the game designers planned” (qtd. in Juul 2005, p. 
77). But players are always still solving the same problem. 
Emergence, the unplanned rising out of a deeply abstract system, 
is always finally an expression of the platform from which it is birthed and 
it returns to the platform as data. Whereas constant updates and patches 
keep the modern game of emergence from ever being solvable, the data 
tracking and accumulation technologies employed by platforms thrive off 
of new and unexpected data streams. Bogost (2008) has argued that 
emergent videogames “mark an important break in their rejections of 
'natural' order, like the rejections [put forth by] Deleuze and Guattari” (p. 
151). The emergent game allows for the radical reappraisal and 
reconfiguration of the self through the degree and “type” of emergence 
allowable by the system. For Bogost, the game of emergence allows for 
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an applied schizoanalysis—as Deleuze and Guattari call their practice—in 
that its low-level simplicity restores meaning to “free-form, localized 
maneuvers” which rely “on individual gestures, not on coordinating system 
operations” (p. 149). The central concern here is the perpetuation of 
openness rather than the rigidity of closed systems of self-hood, identity, 
etc. that potential latent in a network offers. Baldwin (2018) points out that 
this is perhaps most salient in the liberatory potential that avatar-crafting 
can offer trans players, both as a means for creating a space of selfhood 
foreclosed by actual space and as a “free-form, localized maneuver” of 
subversion against established gender constructs. But Bogost also warns 
us of the potential pitfall, that the rhizome always threatens to become a 
rigid structure itself, which dwarfs the individual connections and 
contributions it contains. The map overwhelms the territory, so to speak. 
The postmodern 'dividual,' in the game and on the platform is pre-defined 
contingently and rapidly by the system, with the system the only true 
message. The platform-game and the game-platform do dispense with the 
naturalistic fallacy, but only to reimpose a new nature. A la Baudrillard 
(2010), the emergent interaction of user and platform/game is “neither 
information nor communication, but referendum, perpetual test, circular 
response, verification of the code” (p. 75).  
While the game helps us understand the way that platforms 
manage biopower by manipulating behavior, the platform can help us 
understand the consolidation of real power in the videogame.  
Conclusion 
The shift to designing for emergent behaviors in the game and the 
platform is fundamentally the tacit recognition of a broader conceptual shift 
in power relations under a capitalistic biopolitical regime. Biopolitical 
organization radically redefines the relations between the state, other loci 
of control, and the individual i.e. through the massification of the individual. 
Where the disciplining of the individual was once sufficient to ensure, in 
the perfect case, a compliant subject epitomized by the factory worker 
who recognized and obeyed the edicts of power, the modern user-subject 
unintentionally shapes power itself through his or her behavior. As 
Alexander Galloway (2006) has noted, “[if] diverse technical systems are 
flexible enough to accommodate massive contingency, then the result is a 
more robust system that can subsume all comers under the larger mantle 
of continuity and universalism” (p. 101). The key change that takes place 
with networked power becomes the recognition of informatic control as a 
far more potent tool. Foucault pointed out that the actions of individual 
subjects “are phenomena that are aleatory and unpredictable when taken 
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in themselves or individually, but which, at the collective level, display 
constants that are easy, or at least possible, to establish” (Foucault qtd. in 
Galloway and Thacker 2007. p. 73). I argue that the next step past macro-
scale engagement with populations is the accounting for and successful 
management of the unpredictable itself through the expectation for and 
automatic capture of emergent behaviors.  
All signs point toward a rapid intensification of this merging 
between the logic of games with the maps of platforms. In February 2018, 
Brice Morrison (2018), former lead designer of Zynga, a company known 
for its mobile and Facebook games, penned a piece entitled “The Next 
Surprise Billion Dollar Game Will Be On Alexa” in which he boldly 
proclaims—in the first line no less—that “I'm predicting by 2020 there will 
be a billion dollar game where the primary way to play is with your voice.” 
Natural language play, the powerful AI necessary to make it work, and the 
intense complexity of the saleable data that Amazon would inevitably 
siphon off should give us pause. Since then, games have slowly and 
surely made their way onto that platform: a Pac-Man game, game tie-ins 
for Jurassic World as well as Westworld. While still a far cry from 
Morrison's billion dollar hit or even from really functional games, they are 
harbingers of things to come.  
A little over a month after Morrison published his piece to 
Gamasutra, the Cambridge Analytica scandal broke, and millions of 
Americans were informed that their most trivial actions on Facebook had 
yielded data that had played at least some part in the outcome of the 2016 
election. A profile by Carole Cadwalladr (2018) for The Guardian of Chris 
Wylie, the whistleblower who brought the scandal to light, offered more 
immediately distressing information. Midway through the piece, 
Cadwalladr relates a strange, almost humorous anecdote from an 
unnamed member of Cambridge University's Psychometrics Center (which 
produced papers of great influence on Wylie):  
There was one [program] called You Are What You Like and it was 
demonstrated to the intelligence services. And it showed these odd 
patterns; that, for example, people who liked ‘I hate Israel’ on 
Facebook also tended to like Nike shoes and KitKats. There are 
agencies that fund research on behalf of the intelligence services. 
And they were all over this research. That one was nicknamed 
Operation KitKat.  
This is the product of Facebook quizzes rather than games, but it is 
only a matter of time until categories like Stuart Brown's are turned to the 
same unpredictable ends.  
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Ian Bogost (2018), in his response to the revelations, published a 
piece in The Atlantic admitting to the world that a satirical game he had 
made in 2010 had captured the Facebook data of anybody who played it, 
simply because it was easier to accept the data than not. One month later, 
Newzoo reported that mobile gaming had surpassed 50% of all game 
sales across the globe (Wijman 2018) followed quickly by Bloomberg's 
reporting on a new Google startup to focus on the development of mobile 
games (Frier and Bergen 2018) which would require players to sign up 
with their phone numbers. “Users create accounts with their phone 
numbers, one of the people said. Google is considering it a social-media 
investment because once a game gets to a certain size, it’s something of a 
social network by itself.” 
What most of this has led to is a renewed vigor among various 
public and private spheres to campaign for privacy rights on the internet. 
Privacy concerns in the vein of Cambridge Analytica and Bogost's Cow 
Clicker are important, but what must be kept in mind at all times is that this 
is only one small part, a symptom, of this formal consonance. In a sense, 
even the economic abuses which cloud this new system are symptomatic 
rather than essential. Rather, the overlapping of platforms and games into 
a vast abstract, formal apparatus should be first and foremost considered 
in its totality, as a totalizing force which, by its very virtuality, must be 
thought in its abstraction first, and then on through its particular dangers. 
In the execution of this essay, I have switched between these registers, 
the general/formal and the particular, the molar and the molecular, in order 
to offer an entrée into both aspects of what is doubtless a massively 
complex virtual territory. 
What can we do, then, to stem the tide? Deleuze (2009) counseled 
that “there is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons” 
(p. 90), but our arms are slow in coming. A return to self-contained forms 
of expression and action would be regressive, merely an exchange of 
today's problems for yesterday's. The problems of rigid structures and 
arboreal models gave us the 'solutions' that now plague the society of 
control. Current trends towards the reification of platforms through the 
internet of things will continue to erode the division between the object and 
the platform. Likewise, continuous pushes toward AR technology will 
eventually yield fruit, and the thin membrane separating the game from life 
will disintegrate.   
Almaguer (2018) points to fan modding efforts as one way out of 
the trap. By breaking a game down to its atomic elements and exerting 
almost total control over a game world, the modder circumvents the 
problem of emergence. In modding a world, the gravity of the game 
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swings from the system to the player-modder, who has the capacity to 
truly deterritorialize the game into something utterly different and which 
welcomes further deterritorialization. These “tactical games” (Dyer-
Witheford and De Peuter 2009) have the potential to break free by exiting 
the emergent space. Yet as long as modding remains trapped in a 
broader, extractive platform ecosystem like Steam the problems remain 
the same; the tactical designer is absorbed and becomes a part of the 
“playbor force” (Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter 2009) once again.  
We might point to the platform cooperativism movement as the 
platform analogue. The title of the volume assembled by Trebor Sholz and 
Nathan Schneider (2017)—Ours to Hack and to Own—certainly points to a 
shared hacker mentality between the movement and game modders. At its 
simplest level, the platform cooperativism movement aims at breaking 
down the the division between designer and user, vectoralist and subject, 
that drives the platform's insidious extractive function. At its most extreme, 
it represents a strategy for radically re-wiring the broader economic, 
political, and cultural ecosystem in which platforms operate by providing a 
viable alternative to the tech giants. Yet cooperativism is also plagued with 
insufficiencies and pitfalls. First is simple viability. As Taylor (2017) points 
out, “[history] abounds with rousing examples of cooperative projects, and 
almost as many failure” (p. 234). More seriously, one must question 
whether or not one can generate a truly equitable platform. One can pay 
employees a fair wage, take every possible step to ensure the safety of 
users' data, operate as transparently as possible, and still fail to achieve 
one's ideals simply because a platform is a platform; it can only function 
through extraction. Addressing concerns about privacy risks mistaking the 
symptoms for the disease. A shared platform must still extract data and 
segment the space of possibility.  
Regardless, modding and cooperativism represent positive first 
steps toward identifying genuine strategies for the battle ahead by striking 
at the hidden rigidity of emergence. Only by pushing back on the myth of 
emergence as a liberating aesthetic can we begin to chart a truly radical 
space on in both games and platforms—or indeed whatever more 
egalitarian model may supplant platforms. We need forms of play and 
communication in which action does not generate an identical model, in 
which all our behaviors are not trapped within their own sameness and 
predictability. Certainly the potential for these technologies exist, it is 
simply up to us to discover what they are. Whatever comes may be 
stranger than we think.  
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